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My paper shows how the concept of phronesis was the basis of Gadamer’s thought, right from 
the beginning. In fact, the problem of the development of Aristotle’s thought, and his 
outdistance of Plato and in his critique of the doctrine of ideas, takes place because of this 
concept. I would also refer to the first review of Jäger’s book which is not set out on the 
discussion of the development of aristotelian Metaphysics on the basis of the doctrine of ideas, 
but on the basis of the critique of Good, of the True and the Right. Aristotle develops it in his 
First Book about Nicomachean Ethics and basically on the basis of the critique of the unity of 




0. In one of his last writings, Gadamer tells us about hermeneutics as both a 
theoretical and a practical task. This union of hermeneutic theory and 
hermeneutic practice is given by a concept which is also fundamental because 
of his thought, namely the concept of phronesis. It is translated into Latin 
with prudentia, from which comes jurisprudentia, whose task is to judge or to 
apply a law to a particular case: in German jurisprudentia is also said 
Judikatur. It isn’t easy to translate it into English as there is not, as it often 
happens in relation to Greek language, an equivalent single term. In fact, we 
can translate it either with reasonableness, wisdom or judgment, where the 
last one doesn’t simply mean the ability to judge but being able to judge. It is 
what we commonly mean in spoken language, or better in popular idiom when 
we talk about having sense. When Gadamer needed originally to translate this 
Greek concept of phronesis, which is a focal point of his first interest as 
philosopher and classical philologist, he used, as we know, the term praktisches 
Wissen, that corresponds to practical wisdom. This is also the title of one of 
his first and most brilliant essays, an essay dated 1930, which follows closely 
to his doctorate work and the work for his university teaching qualification, 
Platos dialektische Ethik (Plato’s dialectical Ethic); the latter is dated 1929. 
The essay was published only in 1985, in the 5th volume of the edition of his 
works, which he himself saw through the press, and we’ll mainly talk about 
this one. This work, however, had been anticipated by an essay, which is even 
older than the Plato’s dialectical Ethic, as it is dated back to 1927, and which 
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was a review of the famous book of Walter Jäger, Entstehungsgeschichte der 
Metaphysik, edited in “Hermes”, III vol., 1927: Der aristotelische Protreptikos 
und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik.  
All this shows how the concept pf phronesis was the basis of all his thought, 
right from the beginning. In fact, the problem of the development of 
Aristotle’s thought, and his outdistance of Plato and in his critique of the 
doctrine of ideas, takes place because of this concept. The whole of this first 
review of Jäger’s book is not set out on the discussion of the development of 
Aristotelian Metaphysics on the basis of the doctrine of ideas, but on the basis 
of the critique of Good, of the True and the Right, which Aristotle develops in 
his First Book about Nicomachean Ethics and basically on the basis of the 
critique of the unity of knowing and acting, which constituted the central core 
of Plato’s Ethic. Gadamer himself confided me that he originally wanted to 
write his doctorate work on the Aristotelian Ethic and that this was why he 
planned in the first place to write an introduction to Plato’s Ethic, 
particularly on the Philebus, and that this “brilliant idea” led him to write his 
whole doctorate work on Philebus . We can find traces about his intentions in 
the same review of Jäger, GW, vol. 5, p. 173, in which Gadamer says clearly 
that one needs to take into account the Philebus for being able to determine 
the relation between the concept of phronesis,  as it is worked out in the 
Protreptic, the consequent use of the term Nicomachean Ethic and the relation 
with Plato; this is repeated again further (p. 181), where Gadamer says that 
for following the development of the Aristotelian thought, and in particular of 
his Ethic, a consideration of the Philebus is determining. It shows us not only 
that this is what he tried to do with his doctorate work but also confirms that 
his original intent of the analysis of Philebus  was determined by his interest in 
the terminological fixation of the concept of phronesis; that’s where the entire 
problem of the relationship between Aristotle and Plato takes place. In fact he 
thinks that it is because of the critique of Aristotle, that Plato was thinking 
again about the doctrine of ideas, not only because of the problem of being or 
the problem of truth in the Sophist and in the Parmenides but also in relation 
to the ethical problem, as he had thought it on the basis of the Phedon and the 
Republic. While ideas where originally conceived as principles both of the 
being and of the acting, as Jäger interpreted it, that is as values, so as to build 
a basis of a normative ethic, on the basis of the concept of measure and 
following the ideal of exactness of science and the unity of the theoretical and 
the practical knowledge, in the Philebus we’d have a dialectical ethic, focused 
on the concept of participation between genres, so that the phronesis (which is 
here seen as knowledge) mingles with the opposite principle of pleasure. The 
truth is that it is always measure, which is the determining principle of such a 
mix and therefore it is always the exactness of science, which establishes what 
the good in life is; but at the end we can see that also non-exact sciences enter 
into this mix (pseudes kanòn, see Gad., p. 177). However, this would prove 
The Concept of Phronesis by Aristotle and the Beginning of Hermeneutic Philosophy 
 
 303
how the Aristotelian critique was not able to demolish the concept of Platonic 
metaphysics of ideas and how for Plato it still remains on his feet.  
Gadamer’s aim in this writing is however to prove to Jäger that it is not 
possible to maintain that the Protreptic represents a stage in the Aristotelian 
thought in which he still holds on to the Platonic concept of a normative 
ethic, in regard to his following position in Nicomachean Ethics, and how the 




1. Phronesis in Common Language: Terminological and Philosophical Fixation 
by Aristotle 
 
Gadamer in fact proves how phronesis can indistinctly mean both kinds of 
knowledge, the theoretical and the practical one and that only with the 
Nicomachean Ethic we have the terminological fixation as practical 
knowledge, which therefore means the separation of ethics from metaphysics. 
However, the thematic use of a term, which is given when it becomes the 
object of a particular treatment that distinguishes it, doesn’t prevent it from 
being commonly used in it’s more general and common sense, in fact Aristotle 
himself will use it often in this broader meaning, as it happens in the passages 
of the Protreptic, which we know through Giamblicus and other works. Only 
when the real ethical speculation starts and the human being is distinguished 
from the rest of the universe, because of the divine nous that is in him, he puts 
himself the question of his own behaviour, of what he must do as a man, 
which is distinguished from the rest of the universe and that’s how the 
distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge takes place. In the 
Protreptic we have therefore a non-terminological use of the term because, as it 
is an introductive work to philosophy: it doesn’t require to distinguish or 
make the difference between theoretical and practical knowledge but it 
introduces to both the kinds of knowing.  
It is however in the essay of 1930 that Gadamer develops his interpretation 
of the Aristotelian concept of phronesis in it’s own meaning, which 
distinguishes itself from the Platonic meaning. The Platonic Socrates had been 
criticizing the Sophistic movement, which said that virtue consisted in 
knowledge and was therefore teachable as it was mostly was based on the 
concept of gain, and he had proved in the Protagoras, in the Carmenides and in 
the Euthydemus (we’d add also the Theaetetus) that the concept of gain can’t 
be seen as the measure that the human being has or can have in his own 
acting, because the gain is simply the concept of measurable, of what can be 
measured in the view of a certain aim, which is always else than the one that 
searches the gain itself. The gain is always something, which remains outside 
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from him, and that needs to be searched and established each time and that 
changes always in the various cases; that’s why there is a logos of it, that 
means it is expressible and calculable. But this kind of knowledge is just 
techne, which is teachable and it is not an ethic but a dianoethic virtue as it 
doesn’t concern the exercise of knowledge that the individual puts forward for 
himself in view of his own aim, that means of his own profit even though it is 
that kind of profit, which depends always from somebody else or from an aim 
that is outside of it. It is in this sense that Plato can identify the gain with the 
good (Rep. I, 336 d) and that is enough for discharging Plato - who here 
identifies himself with Socrates - from the accusation of intellectualism; 
Gadamer objects, that in fact Socrates could even been accused of 
utilitarianism in the XIX century.  
For Socrates, therefore, only that knowledge that concerns the gain 
searchable by the single individual for himself and not as simple knowledge, 
but as acting, can be called virtue. Sophrosynes means in fact to do one’s own 
good. That’s why it is knowledge, which is not comparable neither with the 
knowledge of technique nor with that one of science. It is knowledge, but the 
knowledge of oneself and as that it is not teachable, it is not a universally 
valid knowledge. When it becomes an objective knowledge, which is 
determinable by the gain, it ceases to be the knowledge of one owns good, 
which is a acting, the virtue.  
After all Plato needs only to continue on his way, in this case the one of his 
own good (oikeion agathon), which is however also the common good or 
whatever is of gain for the entire community (koine sympheron); moreover, the 
aim of the Republic is to prove that there is no common good, without being 
the good of the city. Yet, is it on the way of the gain as it is, that Plato wants 
to arrive to the good or is the knowledge of good something that goes beyond 
not only of the gain but even the mathematic knowledge? The good of the 
Republic is announced to us as follows: that principle that holds all the 
universe, and on the basis of which men obtains his own gain settling not only 
in the order of the city but also in the order of life and cosmos.  
In virtue of such knowledge of good, which exceeds even mathematic 
sciences, it is not possible anymore to give a difference between theoretical 
and practical science: the theoretic science is sophia and includes both. That’s 
why the politician for the doctrine of the Republic, has to be a philosopher. 
Gadamer forgets here what he had unwind concerning the Philebus: Plato 
himself after the experiences he had made with the tyrant Dioniges, the 
youngster in Syracuse, was brought to look over again not only of the doctrine 
of ideas but his own ethical and political doctrines; at the beginning of the 
Sophist, in fact, they ask the Stranger of Elea if there the sophist, the 
politician and the philosopher are distinguished not only by the name but also 
by the thing.  
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In any case, Gadamer beliefs that Aristotle, when he criticizes the doctrine 
of good, has been breaking the unity of the theoretical knowledge and the 
practical knowledge; Thalet could be seen as sophos, while Pericle couldn’t be 
seen in the same way, but had to be seen as phronimos: not knowing but wise. 
While this adjective was obvious in common language, it wasn’t the same for 
phronesis. It constituted a knowledge of a different kind than the theoretic 
knowledge, the sophia; phronesis is the practical knowledge which is typical of 
the politician as it is firstly the knowledge of the one who can perceive or 
pursue his own aim but which includes, just as it is, also the gain of the city. 
Therefore the citizen that chooses to be guided by a politician, does so because 
he believes that just as the latter is able pursue his own gain, he’ll be able to 
pursue the gain of the city. But the practical knowledge doesn’t distinguish 
itself simply because it can pursue a gain and because it can see the right 
moment for a choice or a decision; if it was like this it wouldn’t be different 
from the technical knowledge; in fact it would have it’s own measure in the 
simple gain, that means outside from itself. In this gain the good has to be 
comprehended; it has to be a knowledge of itself, which is knowledge of its 
own good, which it is capable to produce and not only to know; but being able 
to produce it, means to know it, just as knowing it means to produce it; is it 
not the same, however, with the technical knowledge? Or does this knowledge 
of oneself constitute it as a different kind of knowledge in respect to it? 
 
 
2. The Distinction between Practical and Technical Knowledge 
 
Actually, this distinction is common both to the 10th chapter of the Protreptic, 
and to the first and 6th chapter of Nicomachean Ethics; in both cases the 
distinction between the two kinds of knowledge is effectuated through the 
example of the knowledge of the carpenter, who enters in the place of the 
surveyor, which is the scientist that owns the measure and knows how to 
measure; that means that scientific exactness it’s different from technical 
exactness. In both cases the objects of the controversy are the Sophistic and 
the Rhetoric, which start from the simple knowledge of laws, which already 
exist and are based on the dispute on they usefulness and their possible 
mutation in view of usefulness. This critique to Sophistic, however, takes 
place in different ways in the two texts, the Protreptic and Nicomachean Ethic; 
the first one refers to the definitions, which serve to judging, to knowledge of 
nature and the thing, while the second refers to the experience, to being able 
to distinguish and to judge, which is the consequence of direct contact with 
things. While the Protreptic seems therefore to demand the knowledge of 
philosophy for political science and argues with the Sophistic, Nicomachean 
Ethics only insists on the impossibility to use a knowledge, which is entirely 
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theoretical, in the concrete situation of practical and political life. Gadamer, 
however, as mentioned, proves that Plato had already dealt with these 
problems in the dialogues of the last period (over all in the Philebus) and that 
therefore Aristotle couldn’t ignore them, nor the answers that Plato himself 
had given or tried to give. In fact even in the Protreptic of Aristotle, we can 
find answers of this kind, that is that the pure science of ideas is not 
practicable. The positions of both the Aristotelian works wouldn’t be too far 
from each other. In what consists, however, the true difference between the 
two kinds of knowledge in Nicomachean Ethics? 
Gadamer dedicates a thorough and fascinating analysis to this distinction: 
but he uses themes of Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s philosophy of existence. 
As he himself told us — allow me another anecdote — Heidegger once held a 
private lesson for him in his house on the concept of phronesis. It was in the 
period, when he was elaborating Being and time, and how the concept of 
technical knowledge should bring him to the concept of Zuhandenheit, to be on 
hand, opposite to the Vorhandenheit, the simple being in front off ourselves of 
the theoretical knowledge. That’s why the concept of phronesis would finish 
coinciding with the concept of Sorge, care, which includes also the concept of 
the individual, who is fully interested in his own existence of kierkegaadian 
memory. Thus, to the concept of Worumwille, which represents the telos, of 
the Entschluss, the decision, or of the Entschlossenheit and the Entwurf, 
corresponds the orexis and the proairesis tou biou, the fundamental decision of 
the own choice of life as the will of full realization of oneself: we can find them 
also in Gadamer’s interpretation. All this lacks in theoretical knowledge, and 
can be learnt in an objective way by others, just as it possesses objective 
means, which can be borrowed and acquired and which, on the other hand, 
can’t be given in the case of the practical knowledge concerning one’s own 
existence. Moreover, in technical knowledge, which is represented by an art, 
that means a craft or a profession, one can decide to enter or not to enter, 
while one can’t decide to enter into existence; it is not possible, in fact, to give 
an art of existence or a profession of existence — Gadamer brilliantly finally 
states — and certainly there are no tools for this profession (p. 241). Art, that 
means techne, is on its peak when it doesn’t do anything of what phronesis 
does. Through learning, art tries to find ways to improve its own producing 
and that’s why it can be learnt: but it’s not possible to lean how to exist. 
Phronesis is therefore everybody’s rational reflection on what is useful for 
himself, what serves for his life, the eu zen. That’s why phronesis is the 
knowledge for itself what is good and it’s practice, the exis praktike, that is the 
continuous practice of the practical knowledge, while techniqu is the exis 
poietike, the experience acquired while producing. Gadamer arrives to the 
point of even defining phronesis as die Wachsamkeit der Sorge um sich selbst, 
the watchfulness care for oneself, and this says really everything about 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s relation with Nicomachean Ethics.  





3. Normative ethic?  
 
Even as continuous exercise of the practical knowledge, phronesis doesn’t lack 
of historicity; that’s so not only because it is a continuous exercise, a habitus 
which needs to be acquired with time, the continuous practice, so that, as 
Aristotle say, ethos becomes êthos, custom, the moral law that  people, a city, 
gave themselves and needs to be respected by the citizens. Are therefore 
ethics, which are implied in the Protreptic and are even more developed in 
Eudemian Ethics, normative ethics, compared to Nicomachean Ethics, which 
consist in practical knowledge, in phronesis? Gadamer proves again that both 
the kinds of ethic are on the same level, also seen from a methodological point 
of view and that only the tendency to formalization predominates in 
Eudemian Ethics; actually, they mean the same thing, because also 
Nicomachean Ethics are sciences of the principles, also because they want to 
show the primacy of the oti, of the fact “that things stand like this”, that is 
necessary to start from the facticity of the reality. This doesn’t mean that 
both the works rely on pure and simple empiricism; against this empiricism of 
juridical disputes of sophistic that can’t really rise on the level of science but 
has it’s basis on the validity of factual (nowadays: juridical positivism); both 
assert an authentic concept of experience, that concept from which a practical 
philosophy has to start from and only on which limit there is a authentic 
philosophical science of praxis.  
This conversation about the factual can in fact generate the doubt of ethics 
being dependent from custom or historical laws that people and the city give 
themselves and which depend from the simple state of things. But in this case 
we’d have a knowledge, which is communicable, teachable and learnable by 
everybody and not anymore that practical knowledge, which is made 
essentially by wondering about what would be more useful, righter and lastly 
good and right form me, in my particular situation. We’d have, therefore, a 
positive normative ethic and its application would be only determined by 
ability and experience. But this, says Gadamer, is neither Aristotle nor Plato. 
It is true that Aristotle says that the human acting always takes into account 
the point of view of good; it is êthos, which outlines the direction for men’s 
acting in the concrete forms of virtue (the orexis) and give him his own 
possibility of reflection on the right decision he has to take and on the right 
way and time; but the form of virtue human acting is directed to, is not the 
simple universal, which is given to him or that he finds prescribed but always 
a concrete way of acting of the single and unrepeatable situation. The 
knowledge or the practical sense that needs to take the decision concerning the 
various possibilities of its own way of behaving, determines his way to put 
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himself in respect of the universal norm: so it is him and not the norm, who 
determines the action. It is always the own reflection that determines his 
taking sides and the direction of his acting.  
It is true, thou, that logos and hexis, virtue and reason are not the same 
thing; virtue is not simple knowledge, as Socrates wrongly thought; virtue is 
not a behaviour kata ton logon, following reason, but meta ton orthon logon, 
going along with reason. The direction that ethos prescribes to us, because of 
the upbringing, becomes a concrete behaviour only when it becomes the own 
conviction and the own engagement of mature men. Practical knowledge is 
this unitary phenomenon of reason and behaviour: the choice of action or the 
decision follows the purpose of the glance turned towards good. This choice, 
the proairesis, is both reason, dianoia, and desire, orexis: the concrete practical 
knowledge, phronesis is both knowing what is good for myself and motivation 
to action and practice of virtue. When love or passion takes over in the choice 
and in the decision, the reflection of the practical knowledge fails, and we fall 
out of the track of our moral behaviour: phronesis, the reasonableness – 
Gadamer concludes – is only possible as sophrosyne, wisdom. In fact, ethos is 
not fundamentally determined by knowledge but by the continuous and 
constant exercise of virtue, it is a mental habit, which almost becomes use.  
As matters stand, we could wonder why, after having written a dissertation 
and a work for his university teaching qualification on Plato’s dialectical 
ethics, that is his commentary on Philebus, Gadamer didn’t go ahead writing 
the work about Nicomachean Ethics he was originally projecting or in general 
about Aristotelian Ethics. Concerning his original plan, we only have a work 
of 1930 on the practical knowledge, a writing that should have been edited in a 
volume in honour of Paul Friedländer, which wasn’t published. Actually it 
wasn’t more than an introduction to a true work on Aristotelian ethics even 
though it is a very valuable work, that wants discuss, as we have previously 
seen, the relation between Platonic and Aristotelian Ethics, between 
theoretical and practical knowledge.  
Gadamer didn’t produce any more valuable work until Truth and Method 
and the following works on Hegel’s dialectic. This means, however, that the 
concept of phronesis remains the constant theme of his thought and that 
hermeneutical philosophy was only the development of this theme. This is 
proved by the imprint this theme let on some conferences he hold in Lovanio 
in 1956, which were later published in French under the title The Problem of 
Historical Consciousness; Gadamer had lost the original German text and had 
to publish the French translation he had used for his lessons; the German 
version was edited only in 1985 on the basis of a new translation from French. 
On this conference or on this chapter of historical consciousness, also a chapter 
of Truth and Method is based, “The Hermeneutical Relevance of Aristotle”, 
which is about his concept of phronesis. Therefore Nicomachean Ethics would 
be not only on the basis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, which Volpi calls a 
The Concept of Phronesis by Aristotle and the Beginning of Hermeneutic Philosophy 
 
 309
German translation of this work, but also the fundamental thesis of Truth and 
Method.  
This is proved by later work, which we started speaking about, mentioning 
them at the beginning, in particular in “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and 
Practical Task”. Hermeneutics are therefore possible only on the basis of 
phronesis, it is the reality of phronesis. This means: interpretation is both a 
theoretical and a practical task; that is: to truly know is to translate and to 
translate is an ethical task; Aristotle himself believed sophia to be a practical 
virtue, just as the determination of right acting, of praxis, which is the result 
of a proairesis, of a choice, depends on the other hand from phronesis, from 
reasonableness. What really matters is to distinguish the authentic praxis, the 
ethical acting, from the poiesis, that is a doing, which is the result of knowing, 
in this case of techne, the knowledge of how things need to be done, which is 
however not the knowledge of the purpose or of the reason why they need to 
be done; that’s why Gadamer rightly insists that the practical knowledge is 
the knowledge of oti. In this sense the praxis, even though it is sent to 
reasonableness, can never completely depend on a theory, that means: it is 
not, like technique, the application of a theory. We could also more precisely 
say, that the reasonableness of phronesis, or of prudentia, is not the technical 
rationality, nor the rationality of the critical rationalism, just as the sophia 
towards the good is not a doctrine. We could also use the term ‘competence’, 
which is nowadays so very fashionable, for this reasonableness, which 
constitutes also the principle of the application of universal on particular, or 
of the subsumption of particular under the universal. For the translation of 
Kunstlehre, competence is sometimes the only suitable term, which is also used 
by Gadamer for designate the hermeneutic practice.  
Hermeneutics is actually more a practice, than a technique, as it is not the 
simple application of the rules of a method, which is liable to controls, but 
consist first of all in being able to choose the right aim, the scopus on which 
basis a text has to be interpreted or in being able to catch in the other what he 
wants to say or wants us to understand, also, therefore, the scopus of the 
other, when he want to get in touch with us. There isn’t therefore a doctrine 
that is put before the hermeneutic experience but rather a competence, in the 
meaning of “being able to do”, being able of putting ourselves in contact with 
the other; the hermeneutic practice consists in this art of understanding, just 
as rhetoric is the art of persuasion. In both cases there is therefore an art that 
we could learn, a Kunstlehre, but, just as in the case of linguistic competence, 
it’s the possession of rules that are applied spontaneously; as they tend to the 
understanding and to establish an authentic contact with the other, they can’t 
be simply put under the control of the right application like the rules of a 
certain method, simply because the application of these rules is not the simple 
reproduction of knowledge but the production of new understanding. The 
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same principle is valid for the interpretative relationship as well as the social 
relationship: in the first place basic rules of the ethic relation have to be 
accepted so that there can be understanding. The truth, and we mean the 
truth that concerns us humans, meant not as inhabitants of the world – 
because also the animals are likewise – but as inhabitants of the polis, as 
members of the human community, is not matter of simple knowledge and 
doesn’t rise on the basis of knowledge but of knowing how to behave; this is 
necessary so that there can be a society.  
But, what’s about the truth searched by the philosophy of Plato and then 
by Aristotle, that philosophy that concerned the integration of men into 
universe? Here Gadamer follows Plato closer than he does with Aristotle: no 
logos that could be pronounceable, expressible, can catch the last reason of 
universe; only by reviewing again and again all the possible opinions or 
alternatives, in the common discussion of men that are willing to understand 
each other, we’re suddenly struck by truth, by an answer that lies in the most 
beautiful place of our soul, which is ours and can’t be imposed to anybody 
else: which of course doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist.  
